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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LEWIS J. PINTAR and AFTON B. 
PINTAR, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
MARTIN HOUCK, DARLENE 
HOUCK, SUSAN MORGAN, and 
UTAH COUNTY, 
Defendants/Appellees 
Case No. 20100443 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES SUSAN MORGAN AND UTAH COUNTY 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action is within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of 
Utah, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j). The Supreme Court 
assigned this case to the Court of Appeals by the authority of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue #1: Was the district court correct in concluding that liability for 
Utah County cannot attach under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because Susan Morgan, a 
1 
deputy with the Utah County Sheriffs Department ("Deputy Morgan"), is 
not a policymaker for Utah County? 
Standard of Review: The trial court dismissed the Pintars' 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claims against Utah County pursuant to the Utah County Defendants' 
Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal is a question of law. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 
910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
Issue #2: Was the district court correct in concluding that Deputy 
Morgan is entitled to qualified immunity from the Pintars' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
claims of malicious prosecution and conspiracy? 
Standard of Review: The trial court dismissed the Pintars' 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 claims against Deputy Morgan pursuant to the Utah County 
Defendants' Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The propriety of a 
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law. Whipple v. American Fork 
Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996). In ruling on a motion to dismiss 
for failure to state a claim, the court must construe the complaint in the light 
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most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor. Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Appellants, Lewis J. Pintar and Afton B. Pintar 
(the "Pintars") live in Spanish Fork (Palmyra), Utah and share a boundary 
line with Appellees, Martin and Darlene Houck (the "Houcks"). The 
Pintars' dispute with the Houcks began on July 8, 2004 when Mr. Houck 
sent a letter to Mr. Pintar asking him to keep his irrigation water from 
flooding the Houcks' property. Thereafter, hostilities developed between the 
Pintars and the Houcks, prompting Mrs. Houck to call the Utah County 
Sheriffs Department to complain about Mr. Pintar's verbal and 
demonstrative hostilities towards them. Deputy Morgan investigated Mrs. 
Houck's complaints and eventually issued a class C misdemeanor citation to 
Mr. Pintar for disorderly conduct. 
On October 30, 2006, Utah County Attorney Kay Bryson and Deputy 
Utah County Attorney Timothy Barnes issued a criminal summons and filed 
an information against Mr. Pintar for disorderly conduct. Subsequently, the 
Utah County Attorney's Office moved to dismiss the case against Mr. Pintar 
based on lack of evidence to support the charges and the motion was granted 
on August 1,2007. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition in District Court. Shortly 
thereafter, the Pintars filed a lawsuit against Martin and Darlene Houck, 
their daughter-in-law Tonya Houck (a secretary with the Utah County 
Sheriffs Department), Deputy Morgan, Utah County Attorney Kay Bryson, 
Deputy Utah County Attorney Timothy Barnes, and Utah County. For the 
purpose of this appeal, Tonya Houck, Deputy Morgan, Utah County 
Attorney Kay Bryson, Deputy Utah County Attorney Timothy Barnes, and 
Utah County will be referred to collectively as the "Utah County 
Defendants." 
In their complaint, the Pintars alleged six state law claims in the 
Fourth through Ninth Causes of Action and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims of 
malicious prosecution and conspiracy in the Second and Third Causes of 
Action against the Utah County Defendants. The Utah County Defendants 
moved for dismissal of the state law claims based on the Pintars' failure to 
meet the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's notice of claim requirements. 
At the same time and in a separate motion, the Utah County Defendants 
moved for dismissal of the Section 1983 claims based on the Pintars' failure 
to allege any facts rising to the level of a Section 1983 claim and even if 
they did allege sufficient facts, the individual Utah County Defendants were 
entitled to judicial or qualified immunity. 
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Shortly after filing the motions, the district court dismissed Kay 
Bryson and Timothy Barnes pursuant to a Stipulated Motion to Dismiss and 
subsequent Order dated May 27, 2008. Tonya Houck, Deputy Morgan, and 
Utah County remained in the lawsuit, in addition to Martin and Darlene 
Houck. After briefing was complete on the Utah County Defendants' 
motions to dismiss and oral argument was heard, the district court issued a 
Memorandum Decision on August 20, 2008 and an Order Dismissing Utah 
County Defendants dated September 10, 2008 ("September 10 Order"). 
Aple. Add. p. 22. Martin and Darlene Houck were still parties to the 
lawsuit, as the motions to dismiss did not address the Pintars' claims against 
them. 
The Pintars then appealed the September 10 Order and the Utah 
County Defendants moved for summary disposition. A Memorandum 
Decision was issued and the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal 
because the September 10 Order was not final and was not certified under 
Utah R.Civ.P. 54(b). See 2008 UT App 451 (Aple. Add. p. 30). 
The action continued in the district court with the claims against 
Martin and Darlene Houck only. On a motion for summary judgment, all 
remaining claims were dismissed, pursuant to an order issued on June 14, 
2010. R. 1291. The Pintars filed a notice of appeal on May 28,2010. 
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Deputy Morgan and Utah County were dismissed pursuant to Utah 
R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because the Pintars failed to state a claim for which relief 
can be granted. Under the motion to dismiss standard, the district court must 
only consider the facts alleged in the complaint. Accordingly, Deputy 
Morgan and Utah County state only the relevant facts alleged in the 
complaint upon which the motion to dismiss was granted. 
The Pintars and Martin and Darlene Houck both own real property 
located in Spanish Fork, Utah and share a common boundary line. Both 
have certain rights to irrigation water administered by the Westfield 
Irrigation Company. R. 11, 12, and 211. Deputy Morgan is employed as a 
deputy by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. R. 11 and 211. Tonya Houck 
is the daughter-in-law of Martin and Darlene Houck and is employed by the 
Utah County Sheriffs Office as a secretary. The Pintars allege that Ms. 
Houck has a personal and friendly working relationship with Deputy 
Morgan. R. 10, 11, and 211. Kay Bryson was the Utah County Attorney 
and Timothy Barnes was a Deputy Utah County Attorney at the time of the 
events alleged in the complaint. R. 11. 
Over the years, beginning prior to 2004, disagreements have risen 
between the Pintars and Martin and Darlene Houck regarding the 
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management of the irrigation water between them. R. 10, 11, and 211. On 
May 12, 2006, Deputy Morgan contacted Mrs. Pintar and issued a verbal 
criminal injunction to the Pintars to stop all contact with the Houcks. R. 10 
and 211. Deputy Morgan took this action without following proper 
procedure, without consulting her superiors at Utah County, and without 
disclosing her friendship with Tonya Houck. R. 10 and 211. Deputy 
Morgan also took this action on the basis of complaints presumably made by 
someone in the Houck family about the water issues between the Pintars and 
the Houcks, and about threats made allegedly by the Pintars' son, Nick. R. 
9, 10, and 210. 
On May 14, 2006, Deputy Morgan took another informal, 
undocumented (at the time) report that Mr. Pintar had improperly gestured at 
Martin and Darlene Houck from his property as the Houcks drove by. R. 9. 
Neither Deputy Morgan nor any other representative of the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office contacted Mr. Pintar about the allegations that gave rise to 
the actions taken by Deputy Morgan on May 12, 2006 and May 14, 2006. R. 
9 and 210. 
On June 11 and July 4, 2006, Deputy Morgan received information 
regarding two incidents wherein it was alleged that Mr. Pintar said "there 
goes the monkeys" as Martin and Darlene Houck walked by his property and 
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at a public event, Mr. Pintar shook his finger at Mrs. Houck while making 
derogatory comments. R. 9 and 211. Deputy Morgan did not document 
these incidents until a later date. R. 9 and 211. 
On August 20, 2006, Deputy Morgan received a call from Mr. Houck 
who complained that Mr. Pintar allegedly called him an "asshole" and 
flipped him off from the Plaintiffs' property. R. 9 and 210. Deputy Morgan 
prepared a written summary of the incident and detailed the history of the 
dealings between the parties, but she did not contact the Pintars and did not 
even attempt to undertake a rudimentary investigation. R. 9 and 210. Also 
on August 20, 2006, Deputy Morgan referred the matter to the Utah County 
Attorney's Office for the institution of a criminal prosecution against Mr. 
Pintar for disorderly conduct. R. 8 and 209-210. 
On October 30, 2006, Utah County Attorney Kay Bryson and Deputy 
Utah County Attorney Timothy Barnes received the one and a half page 
narrative prepared by Deputy Morgan and issued a criminal summons and 
filed an information against Mr. Pintar for disorderly conduct. R. 8 and 209. 
The commencement of the criminal matter required Mr. Pintar to appear at 
the Utah County Jail for booking, fingerprinting, photo, and arrest. R. 8. 
The Utah County Attorney's Office moved to dismiss the case against Mr. 
8 
Pintar and the motion was granted on August 1, 2007, based on lack of 
evidence to support the charges. R. 7-8 and 209. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As pertaining to the Utah County Defendants, the Pintars appeal only 
the district court's dismissal of the Section 1983 claims of malicious 
prosecution and conspiracy against Deputy Morgan and Utah County based 
on the Pintars' failure to state a claim pursuant to Utah RXiv.P. 12(b)(6). 
The Pintars never made any factual allegations against Utah County in 
their complaint. While the Pintars agree that Section 1983 liability cannot 
attach to Utah County under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the Pintars 
argue that Deputy Morgan's discretionary action of instituting disorderly 
conduct charges against Mr. Pintar makes Deputy Morgan a policymaker for 
Utah County. According to the Pintars, this makes Utah County liable. 
The district court was correct in ruling that Deputy Morgan is not a 
policymaker. Such a ruling would be an incorrect interpretation of 
municipal liability and lead to the absurd result that all discretionary actions 
by police officers could be considered the creation of municipal policy. In 
turn, the municipality could then be held vicariously liable for a police 
officer's actions, the very thing prohibited by Section 1983. 
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Next, the Pintars argue that Deputy Morgan is not entitled to qualified 
immunity for the Section 1983 claims of malicious prosecution and 
conspiracy because the facts, as alleged in the complaint concerning the 
disorderly conduct charge against Mr. Pintar, do not constitute the crime of 
disorderly conduct. Thus, Deputy Morgan lacked probable cause to bring 
these charges. The district court never ruled on whether the facts constituted 
probable cause and instead, looked at the bigger picture: Whether the 
Pintars alleged facts showing that Deputy Morgan violated Mr. Pintar's 
constitutional rights and whether those facts would clearly establish that a 
reasonable officer would know that the conduct was clearly unlawful. 
The Pintars offer no argument concerning the dismissal of the Section 
1983 conspiracy claim against Deputy Morgan despite including 
"conspiracy" in the title of their argument section. Aplt. Br. at 24. The 
Pintars later argue the Section 1983 conspiracy claim as it pertains to Martin 
and Darlene Houck, for which the district court granted summary judgment. 
Aplt. Br. at 36. In the event the Court decides to consider the argument 
concerning the Houcks as it applies to Deputy Morgan, Deputy Morgan 
offers her argument as to why the district court was correct in dismissing the 
Section 1983 conspiracy claim under the motion to dismiss standard. Her 
argument is based on the Pintars' failure to allege anything more than 
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conclusory allegations that Deputy Morgan was involved in a "conspiracy" 
with Martin and Darlene Houck. Even with the benefit of the deposition 
testimony of Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck, which occurred after they 
were dismissed from the lawsuit and therefore not considered by the district 
court in granting the motion to dismiss, the Pintars still failed to sustain a 
claim of conspiracy against the Houcks and by implication, Deputy Morgan. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE PINTARS FAILED TO STATE A SECTION 1983 CLAIM 
AGAINST UTAH COUNTY. 
A. Introduction. 
The trial court dismissed the Pintars' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against 
Utah County pursuant to the Utah County Defendants' Utah R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1996). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Russell v. Standard 
Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). Following this standard, the district court 
correctly concluded that the Pintars failed to allege a viable Section 1983 
claim against Utah County. 
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In their complaint, the Pintars failed to allege that Utah County has an 
official policy, custom or deliberately indifferent training that led to a 
violation of Mr. Pintar's constitutional rights. The Pintars also failed to 
allege that Deputy Morgan acted pursuant to such official policy or custom, 
or that she received deliberately indifferent training from Utah County. 
Such allegations are the minimum requirement to sustain a Section 1983 
claim premised on municipal liability. 
After failing to make these allegations in the complaint and faced with 
a motion to dismiss, the Pintars then argued that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability 
must attach to Utah County because Deputy Morgan became a policymaker 
for Utah County when she made the discretionary decision to institute 
disorderly conduct charges against Mr. Pintar. The Pintars have alleged no 
facts in the complaint that Deputy Morgan is a policymaker, that she 
establishes the final governmental policy regarding such activity, or that her 
decisions are not reviewable by others. Even if the district court had 
concluded that Deputy Morgan was a policymaker, it would lead to the 
absurd result that all discretionary actions by police officers could be 
considered the creation of municipal policy and therefore, create a municipal 
liability on the basis of respondeat superior that Section 1983 was intended 
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to prevent. As explained below, the Pintars cannot prevail on their 
interpretation of what constitutes municipal liability. 
B. The District Court Was Correct In Dismissing The Section 
1983 Claim Against Utah County Because The Pintars 
Alleged No Facts In Their Complaint That Utah County 
Has Unconstitutional Policies, Customs, Or Provided 
Inadequate Training. 
The Pintars agree with the district court ruling that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
liability cannot attach to Utah County for the actions of Deputy Morgan 
unless they meet the requirements of Monell v. Department of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). It is well settled that a governmental 
entity "may be held liable under Section 1983 only for its own constitutional 
or illegal policies and not for the tortious acts of its employees." Barney v. 
Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 
694). In Monell, the United States Supreme Court concluded that "Congress 
did not intend for local governments to be held liable for their employees' 
actions unless the action that caused a constitutional tort was made pursuant 
to an official policy or procedure." Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. 
Accordingly, municipal liability may not be premised upon the 
employment of a person who has violated a plaintiffs federally protected 
rights. Id. Instead, a municipal wrong is one resulting from the enforcement 
of a municipal policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. A municipal 
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custom or policy may be established through an officially promulgated 
policy, a custom or persistent practice, or deliberately indifferent training 
that results in the violation of plaintiff s federally protected rights. City of 
Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 
Therefore, a plaintiff suing a local government under Section 1983 for 
the acts of one of its employees must prove: (1) that a local government 
employee committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a government 
policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation. 
Myers v. Oklahoma Bd. Of County Comm'rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th 
Circuit 1998) (citing Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 
694 (1978)). Furthermore, liability against a municipality under a theory of 
respondeat superior or vicarious liability is unavailable for claims asserted 
pursuant to Section 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 
The Pintars never allege in their complaint that Utah County has a 
policy or custom that was the moving force behind the constitutional 
deprivation, nor do they allege that Utah County provided inadequate 
training to Deputy Morgan. Rather, the Pintars seek to attach liability to 
Utah County by claiming that Deputy Morgan is a policymaker for Utah 
County. Not only is this allegation absent from their complaint, the Pintars 
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offer no valid support, either in fact or in law, to show that Deputy Morgan 
is a policymaker for Utah County. 
C. The District Court Correctly Concluded, Based On The 
Facts Alleged In The Complaint And The Application Of 
The Law, That Deputy Morgan Is Not A Policymaker For 
Utah County. 
The official policy of requirement of Monell was intended to 
distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of the municipality's 
employees, and thereby makes clear that municipal liability is limited to 
actions for which the municipality is actually responsible: 
Not every decision by municipal officers automatically subjects the 
municipality to § 1983 liability. The fact that a particular official has 
discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not give rise to 
municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion unless the 
official is also responsible, under state law, for establishing final 
governmental policy respecting such activity. 
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). "Only those municipal 
officers who have final policymaking authority may by their actions subject 
municipal government to § 1983 liability." City of St Louis v. Praprotnik, 
485 U.S. 112, 123 (1988). "Whether a particular official has final 
policymaking authority for purposes of § 1983 liability is a question of state 
law.5' Id. "Simply going along with discretionary decisions made by 
subordinates is not "delegation to them of authority" to make city policy for 
purposes of imposing § 1983 liability upon municipality." Id. at 130. 
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In determining whether a municipality can be liable under Section 
1983 for an official's discretionary act, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
examines two factors in deciding whether the official is a final policymaker 
within his area of authority: (1) whether his or her discretionary decisions 
are constrained by general policies enacted by others, and (2) whether those 
decisions are reviewable by others. Milligan-Hitt v. Board of Trustees of 
Sheridan County School District No. 2, 523 F.3d 1219, 1228 (10th Cir. 
1998). Deputy Morgan's decision was clearly restrained by general policies 
and her decision is reviewable by others. 
First, the Pintars argue that it is within the discretion of a single law 
enforcement officer to determine what constitutes a lawful arrest and there is 
no review or constraint prior to an arrest to determine whether it is lawful. 
Under this interpretation, any other law enforcement officer must be 
considered a policymaker for the municipality. However, the Pintars do not 
cite to one case in which a court has determined that an officer's 
discretionary decision to arrest constitutes municipal policy. 
Second, the Pintars correctly state that Deputy Morgan's authority is 
delegated to her by state law and then incorrectly argue that because her 
decision is not immediately reviewable before the execution of that decision, 
she is making policy for Utah County. It is true that the law does not 
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provide for an immediate review of each and every decision of a police 
officer prior to the execution of that decision. However, the law does 
provide a review of actions taken after that decision. In making such an 
argument, the Pintars are attempting to distinguish a "decision" from an 
"action" when no such distinction was made by the Milligan-Hitt court. 
Further, the Pintars did not allege that Deputy Morgan handcuffed Mr. 
Pintar at his home and took him to jail. Instead, the Pintars allege that 
Deputy Morgan referred the matter to the Utah County Attorney's Office for 
the institution of a criminal prosecution against Mr. Pintar for disorderly 
conduct. R. 8 and 209-210. The Pintars further allege that on October 30, 
2006, Utah County Attorney Kay Bryson and Deputy Utah County Attorney 
Timothy Barnes received the one and a half page narrative prepared by 
Deputy Morgan and issued a criminal summons and filed an information 
against Mr. Pintar for disorderly conduct. R. 8 and 209. Based on the facts 
alleged by the Pintars and applicable law, the district court correctly stated 
that Deputy Morgan's actions are constrained by other policies and her 
decisions are reviewable by others. Accordingly, the Pintars have failed to 
meet the Milligan-Hitt test and the district court's decision must be affirmed. 
Finally, the Pintars have not alleged that Deputy Morgan creates Utah 
County policy regarding arrests or that Utah County itself has a policy of 
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false arrest or a policy of intimidation. Rather, Deputy Morgan, as a 
subordinate, made a discretionary decision to arrest Mr. Pintar. Ruling that 
Deputy Morgan created Utah County policy in this instance would only lead 
to the result that all discretionary actions by police officers could be 
considered as the creation of municipal policy and thus make the 
municipality liable for the officers' actions under a theory of respondeat 
superior, the very thing that is prohibited for Section 1983 claims. The 
Pintars' argument is simply without merit and the dismissal of the Section 
1983 claims against Utah County should be affirmed. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
DEPUTY MORGAN IS ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY FROM MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND 
CONSPIRACY UNDER SECTION 1983. 
A. Introduction. 
The trial court dismissed the Pintars' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against 
Deputy Morgan pursuant to the Utah County Defendants' Utah R.Civ.P. 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a 
question of law. Whipple v. American Fork Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218 
(Utah 1996). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor. Russell v. Standard 
Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995). Following this standard, the district court 
18 
correctly concluded that the Pintars failed to allege a viable Section 1983 
claim against Deputy Morgan. 
The Pintars argue that the district court failed to accept the factual 
allegations of the complaint as true in finding that Deputy Morgan is entitled 
to qualified immunity for the claims of malicious prosecution and 
conspiracy under Section 1983. More specifically, the Pintars argue that the 
facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a charge of disorderly 
conduct against Mr. Pintar and that Deputy Morgan violated clearly 
established law. In order to defeat a claim of qualified immunity on a 
motion to dismiss, the Pintars must allege facts which, if taken as true, 
would defeat her qualified immunity claim. The district court correctly 
concluded Pintars have alleged no such facts in their complaint. 
B. The Qualified Immunity Standard, 
Qualified immunity "protects governmental officials from liability for 
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate 'clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known."5 Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (citation 
omitted). To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, 
the court must consider the following: (1) whether, after viewing the facts in 
the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, there was a 
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deprivation of a constitutional or statutory right; and, if so, (2) whether the 
right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation such that a 
reasonable official would understand his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
To overcome the defense of qualified immunity, a plaintiff must 
establish that the defendants' actions violated a constitutional right and that 
the right was clearly established at the time of the actions. Pearson, 129 
S.Ct. 808 at 815-16. It is within the court's discretion to consider either 
factor first. Id. at 818. The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining 
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a 
reasonable officer that his or her conduct was unlawful in the situation he or 
she confronted. Wilson v. Lqyne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). If the law did 
not put the officer on notice that his or her conduct would be clearly 
unlawful, dismissal based on qualified immunity is appropriate. Malley v. 
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 
(1982), the court defined qualified immunity, holding that "governmental 
officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights." Id. at 818. 
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C. Deputy Morgan Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity From 
The Section 1983 Malicious Prosecution Claim. 
The Pintars agree that the district court's recitation of applicable 
qualified immunity law is correct but argue that the district court took "great 
liberties with the facts" when it applied the law to them. The Pintars' entire 
argument is based on the theory that the facts alleged in the complaint do not 
constitute probable cause for disorderly conduct and therefore, Deputy 
Morgan's actions were unreasonable. The district court never ruled on 
whether the facts constituted probable cause and instead, looked at the 
bigger picture: Whether the Pintars alleged facts showing that Deputy 
Morgan violated Mr. Pintar's constitutional rights and whether those facts 
would clearly establish that a reasonable officer would know that the 
conduct was clearly unlawful. 
The Pintars further attempt to distinguish the cases cited by the district 
court to support its conclusions on the ground that the facts pled by the 
Pintars do not allege a crime, unlike the facts alleged in Anderson and Beard 
which are examined below. In doing so, the Pintars ignore the fact that the 
district court never made a finding that the Pintars5 facts did or did not 
constitute disorderly conduct. Further, even if Deputy Morgan erroneously 
believed the facts constituted a disorderly conduct charge, she turned the 
matter over to the prosecutor who proceeded to issue a criminal summons 
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and file an information against Mr. Pintar for disorderly conduct. R. 8. 
Even if the prosecutor had erroneously decided that the facts constituted 
disorderly conduct, Deputy Morgan cannot be held liable for his actions. 
In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), a police officer 
conducted a warrantless search for a suspect in the plaintiffs home on what 
he perceived to be exigent circumstances. Id. The suspect was not found 
and the plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that their Fourth Amendment rights had 
been violated. Id. The Supreme Court explained that although a right may 
be clearly established in the Constitution, it does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the officer's actions were unreasonable under the 
circumstances. Id. at 641. The Supreme Court recognized that "it is 
inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases reasonably but 
mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated 
that in such cases those officials . . . should not be held personally liable." 
Id. The Pintars attempt to distinguish this case by claiming that the facts, as 
presented to the prosecutor by Deputy Morgan, even if true, did not 
constitute a crime, unlike the facts in Anderson. The Pintars likewise 
attempt to distinguish Beard v. City of Northglenn, 24 F.3d 110 (10th Cir. 
1994), a case more similar to the instant case. 
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In Beard, the plaintiff claimed that the warrant contained false 
information which the police officers failed to adequately investigate. Id. at 
14. The Tenth Circuit defended the officer's qualified immunity and 
reaffirmed that a constitutional violation does not occur merely because later 
events demonstrate that the arrested person is innocent. Id. The Tenth 
Circuit further reiterated the established principle that negligence cannot 
form the basis of a constitutional violation. Id. at 115. 
The Pintars allege in their complaint that because the allegations 
leading to Mr. Pintar's arrest were false, Deputy Morgan's actions were 
unreasonable. The Pintars do not allege that Deputy Morgan fabricated the 
allegations herself but rather, Deputy Morgan failed to properly investigate 
the claims before turning over her report to the Utah County Attorney's 
Office for prosecution. R. 9. As the Beard court stated: 
[Tjhe failure of the arresting officer to investigate the matter 
fully, to exhaust every possible lead, interview all potential 
witnesses, and accumulate overwhelming corroborative 
evidence rarely suggests knowing or reckless disregard for truth 
so as to constitute Fourth Amendment violation; rather, it is 
generally considered to betoken negligence at most. 
Id. at 111. 
Additionally, Deputy Morgan is entitled to qualified immunity 
because the Pintars have not alleged or shown that she is responsible for the 
actions taken by Utah County Attorney Kay Bryson or Deputy Utah County 
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Attorney Timothy Barnes after she turned the matter over to them. R. 8. 
Even if the information given to the prosecutor did not amount to a 
disorderly conduct charge, as the Pintars claim, Deputy Morgan cannot be 
held liable for the actions of the Utah County Attorney's Office when it 
issued a criminal summons and information against Mr. Pintar for disorderly 
conduct. R. 8. Clearly, the decision to prepare and initiate the charges 
based on the facts received from Deputy Morgan falls within the scope of 
their duties as prosecutors. The Pintars cannot show that Deputy Morgan 
has any control over their actions. Deputy Morgan has no control over their 
actions and the Pintars have not alleged any impropriety by Deputy Morgan 
after she turned the matter over to prosecutors. 
Whether or not the prosecutor was correct in issuing a criminal 
summons and information based on the information given to him by Deputy 
Morgan is irrelevant. The prosecutor was dismissed by stipulation and 
Deputy Morgan cannot be held liable for the actions of the prosecutor. 
Therefore, the district court was correct in ruling that Deputy Morgan is 
entitled to qualified immunity for the malicious prosecution claim. 
D. Deputy Morgan Is Entitled To Qualified Immunity From 
The Section 1983 Conspiracy Claim. 
The Pintars tie the conspiracy claim with the malicious prosecution 
claim under Section 1983 by alleging that Deputy Morgan took false 
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information from the Houcks and failed to investigate the charges before 
turning the matter over to the prosecutor because she was conspiring with 
the Houcks. The Pintars base their conclusions on their allegation that 
Deputy Morgan had a friendship with their daughter-in-law, Tonya Houck, 
who also worked at the Utah County Sheriffs Office. 
The Tenth Circuit has indicated that "a conspiracy to deprive a 
plaintiff of a constitutional or federally protected right under color of state 
law" was actionable. Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 701 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(citing Dixon v. City o/Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443 (10th Cir. 1990)). However, 
in order to prevail on such a claim, "a plaintiff must plead and prove not 
only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation or rights; pleading and 
proof of one without the other will be insufficient." Id. (quoting Earle v. 
Benoit, 850 F.2d 836, 844-46 (1st Cir. 1988)). In the instant case, the 
Pintars must first show that there was an actual deprivation of their 
constitutional rights before the conspiracy claim can be considered. 
To sustain a conspiracy claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must 
allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action among 
defendants. Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1199 (10th Cir. 2007) 
(citing Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 
1998)). Conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a valid 
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Section 1983 claim. Tonkovich v. Kansas Board of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 
533 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 
1994). 
The Pintars present nothing more than conclusory allegations of 
conspiracy based on the following facts concerning Tonya Houck: (1) Ms. 
Houck is employed as a secretary in the Judicial Services Division of the 
Utah County Sheriffs Office; (2) Ms. Houck happens to be the daughter-in-
law of codefendants Darlene and Martin Houck; and (3) Ms. Houck has an 
alleged friendship with Deputy Morgan. (Complaint, \ 16.) None of these 
allegations, even if all true, separately or together, show a concerted 
agreement and action involving Deputy Morgan that rises to the level of a 
conspiracy under Section 1983. 
The Pintars have not properly pled the elements of civil conspiracy 
and draw their conclusions from their conclusory facts because there are no 
facts alleged in the complaint which connect the Houcks with Deputy 
Morgan other than that Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan were friends and 
that both women are employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office in 
different divisions. The Pintars, as with the malicious prosecution issue 
discussed above, do not allege facts in their complaint that Tonya Houck 
used her alleged friendship with Deputy Morgan to coerce her to falsely 
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arrest Mr. Pintar. Rather, the Pintars make only conclusory allegations, 
which are insufficient to establish a claim of conspiracy under Section 1983. 
CONCLUSION 
Liability cannot attach to Utah County under Section 1983 because 
Deputy Morgan is not a policymaker for Utah County based on her 
discretionary decision to institute charges against Mr. Pintar and then turning 
the matter over to the Utah County Attorney's Office. Deputy Morgan is 
also entitled to qualified immunity from the Section 1983 claims of 
malicious prosecution and conspiracy because the Pintars have not pled any 
facts sufficient to state a claim. Even if Deputy Morgan failed to fully 
investigate the matter, at the most, she was negligent and negligence does 
not support a Section 1983 claim. If the facts given to the Utah County 
Attorney's Office did not support a charge of disorderly conduct, Deputy 
Morgan has no control over their actions. 
Finally, the Pintars have not pled facts sufficient to show a conspiracy 
between Deputy Morgan and the Houcks. For these reasons, Deputy 
Morgan and Utah County respectfully request that the Court affirm the 
decision of the district court dismissing Deputy Morgan and Utah County. 
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Utah R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) 
b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of juiisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of 
jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of 
process, (5) insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. 
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before pleading if a 
further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being 
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such motion or 
objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may 
assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a 
motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside 
the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 
56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all 
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1983 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall notbe granted unless a declaratory 
decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the 
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the 
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia, 
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F I L E D 
AUG 2 0 2008 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEWIS J. PINTAR and AFTON B. PINTAR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MARTIN HOUCK, DARLENE HOUCK, 
TONYA HOUCK, SUSAN MORGAN, 
COUNTY OF UTAH, and DOES 2-50, 
Defendants. 
MEiMOK UsiH M l)K( 1SION 
Date: August 20, 2008 
Case No.: 070403245 
Judge: Gary D. Stott 
On March 25, 2008, defendants Tonya Houck, Susan Morgan and Utah County ("Utah 
County Defendants55) filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs5 State Law Claims with supporting 
memorandum, a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims with supporting memorandum, 
and a Motion to Bifurcate the proceedings. The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law Claims is 
based on Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims is based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Motion to 
Bifurcate is based on Rule 42(b). 
Plaintiffs Lewis J. Pintar and Afton B. Pintar ("Plaintiffs55) filed their Oppositions to the three 
motions on May 13, 2008. Utah County Defendants filed their memoranda in reply on June 11, 
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2008, along with requests to submit for decision. The court heard oral arguments on all three 
motions on July 21,2008. The court now issues this memorandum decision and grants Utah County 
Defendants5 Motions to Dismiss. 
BACKGROUND 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court "must construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his favor." Mounteer v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). In that light, the Court sets forth the facts 
of the case. 
Plaintiffs live in Spanish Fork, Utah, and share a boundary line with defendants Martin 
and Darlene Houck ("the Houcks"). Plaintiffs and the Houcks both have rights to irrigation 
water administered by Westfield Irrigation Company. Over the past several years, disagreements 
have arisen between Plaintiffs and the Houcks regarding the management of the water rights. 
These disagreements have led to hostility between the parties. 
Tonya Houck, who is the daughter-in-law of the Houcks and works as a secretary at the 
Utah County Sheriffs Office, has a personal and friendly working relationship with Deputy 
Susan Morgan ("Deputy Morgan"), who is also employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. 
On May 12,2006, Deputy Morgan contacted Plaintiff Afton Pintar and issued a verbal 
criminal injunction to the Plaintiffs to stop all contact with the Houcks. Deputy Morgan took 
this action without following proper procedure and without consulting her superiors at Utah 
County. Deputy Morgan also did not disclose to her superiors her friendship with Tonya Houck. 
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Deputy Morgan took this action on the basis of complaints presumably made by someone in the 
Houck family about the water issues between Plaintiffs and the Houcks and threats allegedly 
made by Plaintiffs' son to the Houcks. Deputy Morgan issued this criminal injunction under 
penalty of criminal prosecution. 
On May 14,2006, Deputy Morgan took another informal, undocumented report that 
Plaintiff Lewis Pintar had improperly gestured at the Houcks from his property as the Houcks 
drove by. Neither Deputy Morgan nor any other representative of the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office contacted Plaintiff Lewis Pintar about the allegations that gave rise to the actions taken by 
Deputy Morgan on May 12, 2006, and May 14, 2006. 
On June 11,2006, and July 4, 2006, Deputy Morgan received information regarding two 
other incidents between Plaintiffs and the Houcks, wherein it was alleged that Plaintiff Lewis 
Pintar made derogatory comments about the Houcks in their presence. Deputy Morgan did not 
document these incidents until a later date. Deputy Morgan did not contact the Plaintiffs 
regarding these incidents, nor did Deputy Morgan review the matter with supervisors or county 
attorneys. On August 20, 2006, Deputy Morgan received a call from Martin Houck, who 
complained that Plaintiff Lewis Pintar allegedly called him an "asshole" and flipped him off 
from the Plaintiffs5 property. Deputy Morgan prepared a written summary of the incident and 
detailed the history of the dealings between the parties, but she did not contact the Plaintiffs. 
The claims made by the Houcks accusing the Plaintiffs of inappropriate conduct are false. 
On August 20, 2006, Deputy Morgan referred the matter to the Utah County Attorney's 
Page 3 of 18 
Addendum Page 5 
Office for the institution of a criminal prosecution against Plaintiff Lewis Pintar, charging 
disorderly conduct. On October 30, 2006, the Utah County Attorney's Office received the one-
and-a-half page narrative of Deputy Morgan and issued a criminal summons and filed an 
information against Plaintiff Lewis Pintar for disorderly conduct. Plaintiff Lewis Pintar was 
served with the summons by substitute service on November 2, 2006. The commencement of 
the criminal matter required the appearance of Plaintiff Lewis Pintar at the Utah County Jail for 
booking, fingerprinting, photo, and arrest. This information was made public both as a matter of 
public record and the posting of Plaintiff Lewis Pintar's picture and booking information on the 
Utah County Jail website. Plaintiff Lewis Pintar retained counsel in the matter. The Utah 
County Attorney's Office made a motion to dismiss the case which was granted on August 1, 
2007, based on the lack of evidence to support the charges. 
Plaintiffs served a notice of claim on Utah County on November 1, 2007. On the same 
day, November 1, 2007, Plaintiffs filed their complaint naming as defendants Martin Houck, 
Darlene Houck, Tonya Houck, Susan Morgan, Kay Bryson, Timothy Barnes, and Does 1-50. 
Plaintiffs brought eleven causes of action, including a request for declaratory relief, and claims 
for malicious prosecution under section 1983, conspiracy under section 1983, civil conspiracy, 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, 
negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation. On February 14, 2008, Plaintiffs 
amended their complaint to include Utah County as a defendant since 60 days had elapsed since 
they had served their notice of claim on Utah County and had received no response. 
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DISCUSSION 
I. MOTION TO DISMISS STATE LAW CLAIMS 
The court grants Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law 
Claims, Plaintiffs brought six state law causes of action against Utah County Defendants: civil 
conspiracy, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
defamation, negligent misrepresentation, and intentional misrepresentation (ustate law claims"). 
As argued by Utah County Defendants, Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with the requirements 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"), which deprives this court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs' state law claims against Utah County Defendants. 
A* Notice of Claim under UGIA 
The UGIA requires that a person having a claim against a governmental entity or an 
employee of that entity must file a notice of claim. Specifically, UGIA's notice requirement 
provides: 
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the 
scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with 
the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or not the function giving 
rise to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(I) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and 
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as 
provided in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)©, the name of the employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2)-(3) (2008) (previously section 63-30d-401). In addition, 
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section 63G-7-402 requires that a claimant file a notice of claim "with the person and according 
to the requirements of Section 63G-7-401 within one year after the claim arises...." Utah Code 
Ann. § 63G-7-402. If the governmental entity denies the claim or fails to respond within 60 days 
of the claim being filed, "a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the 
governmental entity or an employee of the entity." Id. at § 63G-7-403(2)(a). Plaintiffs have 
failed to meet several of the requirements embodied in the notice statute. The court will address 
the dispositive provisions of UGIA supporting its decision to grant Utah County Defendants' 
motion. 
1. Claim against an employee 
Subsection (2) of section 63G-7-401 requires that a person having a claim against an 
employee of a governmental entity must file a written notice of claim with the entity before 
maintaining an action if the employee was acting during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority. Id. at § 63G-7-401(2), 
Initially, Plaintiffs argued that Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck were acting outside the scope 
of their employment, and the notice requirements of UGIA were therefore inapplicable. 
However, Plaintiffs conceded on the record at oral arguments that Deputy Morgan and Tonya 
Houck were acting at least under color of authority, which renders any claims against them 
subject to the notice requirements of UGIA. 
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Claim with the Utah County Clerk on October 31, 2007. 
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint naming Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck as defendants on 
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November 1, 2007, without waiting for Utah County to approve or deny their claims against 
Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck or for the expiration of the 60 days. Therefore, Plaintiffs 
failed to comply with the notice requirements of section 63G-7-401(2). Plaintiffs' argument that 
there is still time to correct the defective Notice is without merit and is discussed in further detail 
below. 
2. Nature of the claim asserted 
As noted above, the notice of claim must set forth the nature of the claim asserted. Utah 
Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(3)(ii). The Utah Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of the 
notice requirement is to allow the governmental entity "an oppoitumty to correct the condition 
that caused the injury, evaluate the claim, and perhaps settle the matter without the expense of 
litigation." Houghton v. Dep 'f of Health, 2005 UT 63, P20. The provision requiring a claimant 
to set forth the nature of the claim asserted mandates "enough specificity in the notice to inform 
as to the nature of the claim so that the defendant can appraise its potential liability." YearsJey v. 
Jensen, 798 P,2d 1127,1129 (Utah 1990). 
Plaintiffs rely on Peeples v. State of Utah, 2004 UT App 328, 100 P.3d 254, for the 
assertion that their notice of claim was sufficient in setting forth the nature of the claim because 
a claimant is not required to exceed the requirements of the UGIA. The court disagrees. In 
Heideman v. Washington City, 2007 UT App 11, P13, 155 P.3d 900, the Utah Court of Appeals 
held that the plaintiffs' notice of claim was inadequate because in setting forth the nature of the 
claim, they listed breach of contract, section 1983 claims and other causes of action. The court 
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found that this notice of claim failed to give the defendant notice of potential claims for 
intentional interference with economic relations. Id. at PI3. 
Here, in the section setting forth the nature of their claims, Plaintiffs recited allegations 
concerning failure to implement and enforce rules, malicious prosecution, and conspiracy. 
Plaintiffs never actually stated that they have a claim for "malicious prosecution/' as such, nor 
did they mention anywhere in sections setting forth the facts or the nature of the claims asserted 
that they had potential claims for defamation, misrepresentation, or infliction of emotional 
distress. Despite Plaintiffs' argument that it is "well-known to Utah County and/or its insurer 
that Defamation, Negligent and Intentional Misrepresentation, and Negligent and Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress arise out of circumstances associated with wrongful arrest, 
malicious prosecution and conspiracy," the court concludes that Plaintiffs' notice of claim failed 
to adequately set forth the nature of the claims asserted. As noted above, the notice of claim is 
intended to give enough specificity to the governmental entity so that it can ascertain its potential 
liability. Plaintiffs' notice of claim identifying only malicious prosecution and conspiracy failed 
to give enough specificity to Utah County to ascertain its potential liability on the claims for 
defamation, misrepresentation, or infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, Plaintiffs failed to 
strictly comply with the requirement of UGIA setting forth the nature of the claims asserted with 
respect to defamation, misrepresentation, and infliction of emotional distress and these claims 
are subsequently barred. 
3. Time to correct or file new notice of claim 
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In addition to the requirements of section 63G-7-401, UGIA requires that the notice of 
claim be filed "within one year after the claim arises.. . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-402. All of 
Plaintiffs' state law claims are tort causes of action. As noted by Utah County Defendants, "[a] 
tort cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is actionable." 
Retherfordv. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992). 
Utah County Defendants argue that the elements of all the state law claims accrued on 
November 2, 2006, the day that Plaintiff Lewis Pintar was served with the criminal summons 
because the alleged defamatory statements, misrepresentations and emotional distress inflicted 
by Tonya Houck, Deputy Morgan, and Utah County happened prior to Lewis Pintar being served 
with the criminal summons. Plaintiffs argue that their claims accrued on August 1, 2007, the 
date on which the criminal action was terminated in Lewis Pinter's favor. Plaintiffs assert that 
since the cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the action is terminated 
in a plaintiffs favor, they have until August 1, 2008, to file a notice of claim against Utah 
County. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on accrual of the elements of malicious prosecution is misplaced, as 
noted by Utah County Defendants. Plaintiffs brought their malicious prosecution cause of action 
under section 1983, so it is not subject to the one-year time limit of UGIA. The one-year time 
limit imposed by section 63G-7-402 began to run when the elements of civil conspiracy, 
infliction of emotional distress, defamation and misrepresentation accrued. Because the Utah 
County Attorneys were dismissed from the lawsuit, the actions constituting the elements of these 
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torts must have been taken by Tonya Houck 01 Deputy Morgan and not the Utah County 
Attorneys. 
The court concludes that any actions allegedly constituting defamation, infliction of 
emotional distress, misrepresentation and conspiracy were taken by Tonya Houck and Deputy 
Morgan prior to Lewis Pintar being served with the criminal summons on November 2,2006. 
Therefore, Plaintiffs had until November 2, 2007, to file a proper notice of claim against Utah 
County for their state law claims. However, even if the court were to accept the date argued by 
Plaintiffs as the date the causes of action accrued, Plaintiffs likewise failed to file a proper notice 
of claim on Utah County by August 1, 2008, and are therefore barred from filing a notice of 
claim against Utah County under section 63G-7-402, 
Because Plaintiffs' notice of claim was filed prematurely, did not adequately identify the 
nature of the claims asserted, and the time to file a proper notice of claim has expired, the court 
hereby grants Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law Claims. 
II. MOTION TO DISMISS SECTION 1983 CLAIMS 
The court grants Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 
claims. Plaintiffs brought claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy under section 1983 
("section 1983 claims"). As argued by Utah County Defendants, Plaintiffs failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted due to the lack of municipal liability for the discretionary 
actions of its officers. There is not relief under a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of 
a municipality's employees. Additionally, Utah County Defendants may claim relief under 
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qualified immunity for discretionary actions where the officers did not clearly know their actions 
were violative of the law. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Section 1983 Claims must therefore 
be granted. 
A. Liability of Municipality under Section 1983 
Vicarious liability through a §1983 violation may not be imposed on a governing body 
merely by the existence of an employer/employee relationship. Although foreclosing relief 
under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
government municipality may be sued under §1983 when official municipal policy or custom is 
the "moving force" behind the constitutional violation and the tortious acts of its employees. 
Monell v. New York City Dep }t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The importance of 
their holding is to distinguish the acts of an employee from the acts of the municipality, thereby 
limiting immicipal liability to actions "for which the municipality is actually responsible"- those 
which they have sanctioned or ordered. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479-80 
(1986). 
Although there must be a "direct causal link between the municipal policy or custom and 
the alleged constitutional deprivation," City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989), hi 
Pembaur, the Supreme Court found that a municipal policy or custom may be established "by a 
single decision by municipal policymakers" if it was made under certain circumstances. 475 
U.S. at 480. The Court clarified by stating that the decision must be said to reflect the 
municipality's official policy. Id. "Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker 
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possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The 
fact that a particular official... has discretion in the exercise of a particular function does not, 
without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion,'5 Id. at 482. 
In the case of a decision on a single occasion, a municipality is responsible only for 
actions taken by final policymakers whose conduct may be said to represent official policy, 
Simons v. Uintah Special Services District, 506 F.3d 1281,1286 (10th Cir. 2007). Although the 
identification of policymaking officials is a question of state law, (St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 
U.S. 112 (1988)), there arc primarily two factors that a court will consider: 1) whether his/her 
discretionary decisions are constrained by other policies, and 2) whether those decisions are 
reviewable by others. Milligan-Hitt v. Board of Treasurers of Sheridan County No. 2, 523 F.3d 
1219, 1228 (10th Cir. 2008). "When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by 
policies not of that officiars making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departure from 
them, are the act of the municipality/' Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127. 
Plaintiffs argue that Deputy Morgan may be considered a policymaker for the State of 
Utah because she made a unilateral decision within her discretion with, regards to the arrest and 
subsequent prosecution of plaintiffs. However, the defendants in question did not act according 
to official policy, nor could their actions be construed to represent official policy. Deputy 
Morgan cannot be considered a policy maker for Utah County because her actions, though 
discretionary, are still constrained by other policies, and because her decisions are reviewable by 
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others. Plaintiffs have brought forth no allegations that official Utah County policy was 
unconstitutional, and in the absence of evidence that Deputy Morgan's actions constituted 
official policy, or that her decisions were reviewed and ratified by those having official policy 
making authority, the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants for a Section 1983 violation 
cannot stand. 
B. Absolute Immunity of Tonya Houck 
Tonya Houck is a secretary in the Judicial Services Division of Utah County. Although 
she is not a court clerk, Utah County Defendants argue that many of her functions and duties as a 
secretary in Judicial Services may be considered the functional equivalent of a court clerk. 
Defendants have argued that inasmuch as those duties were involved in the case before the court, 
she may be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Ambus v. Utah State Board of Education, 858 
P.2d 1372, 1382 (Utah 1993). However, this Court finds this argument tenuous and focuses its 
attention on the qualified immunity claims discussed below which form a more substantial basis 
for the court's decision. 
C. Qualified Immunity of Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck 
Utah County Defendants argue that Tonya Houck and Deputy Susan Morgan are entitled 
to qualified immunity as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800 (1982). In Harlow, the Court affirmed its holding from prior cases that 
"governmental officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability 
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for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or 
constitutional rights.'5 Id. at 818. In reaching this holding, the Court briefly discussed the 
history of the qualified immunity doctrine, noting that it was established in an attempt to balance 
the need for vindicating constitutional guarantees with the need for terminating insubstantial 
lawsuits and minimizing the societal cost that results from suits against government officials. Id. 
at 814. In a later case, Motley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986), the Court explained, "As the 
qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." 
When analyzing a claim of qualified immunity on the part of a governmental defendant, a 
court must initially consider two factors: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, show that the official violated the plaintiffs constitutional right, and 
(2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). In 
explaining what it means for a right to be clearly established, the United States Supreme Court in 
Saucier stated, "The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly 
established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in 
the situation he confronted." Id. at 202. The court cited to an earlier U.S. Supreme Court case, 
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999), in which the court stated that "the right allegedly 
violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it 
was clearly established." The Saucier court further explained that "[i]f the law did not put the 
officer on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful, summary judgment based on 
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qualified immunity is appropriate. A later Supreme Court case explained that the particular 
action in question did not have to previously have been held to be unlawful, but "in the light of 
pre-existing law, the unlawfulness of the action must be apparent/' Anderson v. Creighton, 483 
U.S. 635,640(1987). 
In Anderson, a police officer conducted a warrantless search for a suspect in the 
plaintiffs home on what he perceived to be exigent circumstances. 483 U.S. 635. The suspect 
was not found and the plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that their Fourth Amendment right to be free 
of unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated. Id. The Supreme Court explained that 
although a right may be clearly established in the Constitution, it does not necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the officer's actions were unreasonable in the circumstances. Id. at 641. The 
Court recognized that "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in some cases 
reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have indicated that in 
such cases those officials . . . should not be held personally liable." Id. The Court concluded by 
stating that the general rule behind qualified immunity is to provide government officials with 
the ability to reasonably anticipate when tlieir conduct may give rise to liability so that as long as 
their actions are reasonable, they may not fear to act. Id. at 646 (citing Davis v. Scherer, 468 
U.S. 163, 195 (1984)). 
In a case similar to that at bar, the plaintiff sued the defendant officers under a Section 
1983 violation for arresting the plaintiff on the false assumption that he was involved in a check 
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kiting scheme. Beard v. City ofNorthglenn, 24 F.3d 110 (10th Cir. 1994). The plaintiff claimed 
the warrant contained false information which die officers failed to adequately investigate. Id. at 
114. The Tenth Circuit defended (he defendant's qualified immunity and reaffirmed that a 
constitutional violation does not occur merely because later events demonstrate the arrested 
person is innocent. Id. The court further reiterated the established principle that negligence 
cannot form the basis of a constitutional violation. Id. at 115. 
Plaintiffs have alleged that because the allegations that led to their arrest were false, that 
Deputy Morgan's actions were unreasonable. If this premise were true, then any officer who 
arrested someone falsely would be liable to that person. This in turn would increase the burden 
upon the government and provide a disincentive to officers to perform their duty under the law. 
Qualified immunity was established to protect officers from liability for actions that were 
objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Certainly this creates a more difficult, though 
not impossible hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome when they sue a government official. 
Under the established qualified immunity framework, Plaintiffs must allege facts 
showing that Houck and Morgan violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights that were clearly 
established such that a reasonable officer would know that the conduct engaged in by Houck and 
Morgan was clearly unlawful. Plaintiffs cite to their Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable seizure and to be subject to arrest only when there is probable cause. Although a 
right may be clearly established by the Constitution, it does not automatically lead to the 
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conclusion that a defendant's deprivation of that right was unreasonable. The fact that the 
charges tendered against the Plaintiffs later turned out to be unsubstantiated does not make the 
defendant's actions unreasonable in light of the circumstances then prevailing. And as the 
Supreme Court reiterated in Anderson, "it is inevitable that law enforcement officials will in 
some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause is present, and we have 
indicated that in such cases those officials . . . should not be held personally liable." 483 U.S. at 
641. Utah County Defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity* 
Because Utah County is not vicariously liable under section 1983 and Tonya Houck and 
Deputy Morgan are entitled to qualified immunity, the court grants Utah County Defendants5 
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims. 
IIL MOTION TO BIFURCATE 
Based upon the court's decision to grant Utah County Defendants' motions to dismiss, 
the Motion to Bifurcate is rendered moot. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' 
State Law Claims and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims are hereby 
GRANTED. Based on this decision, the Motion to Bifurcate is rendered moot. Counsel for 
Utah County Defendants shall prepare an appropriate order consistent with this opinion for 
signature by the court. 
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Dated this ftQ day of 
H 
, 2008. 
Judge Gary D 
Fourth Judicial District Couit 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
LEWIS J. PINTAR and AFTON B. PINTAR, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MARTIN HOUCK, DARLENE HOUCK, 
TONYA HOUCK, SUSAN MORGAN, KAY 
BRYSON, TIMOTHY BARNES, COUNTY 
OF UTAH, and DOES 2-50, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DISMISSING 
UTAH COUNTY DEFENDANTS 
Case No. 070403245 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This matter came before the Court on July 21, 2008 at a hearing on a Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs' State Law Claims, a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 1983 Claims, and a Motion 
to Bifurcate filed by Tonya Houck, Susan Morgan, and Utah Coxmty (collectively, "Utah County 
Defendants"),1 In attendance were Jason L. Pintar, representing Plaintiffs Lewis J. Pintar and 
Afton B. Pintar; Peter C. Schofield representing Defendants Martm Houck and Darlene Houck; 
1
 Defendants Kay Bryson and Timothy Barnes were dismissed pursuant to an Order dated May 27,2008. 
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and Kathleen M. Liuzzi representing Utah County Defendants. The Court, having reviewed the 
pleadings and documents filed in this matter, having heard oral argument, and for good cause 
appearing, enters the following Order: 
I, MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD, 
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court "must construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all reasonable inferences in his or her favor. Mounteer v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah 1991). The Court issued a Memorandum 
Decision on August 20, 2008, setting forth in detail the facts alleged in the Complaint as well as 
detailed legal reasoning upon which the Court bases its ruling. That Memorandum Decision is 
incorporated herein by reference. 
n. UTAH COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS' STATE 
LAW CLAIMS. 
The Court GRANTS Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' State Law 
Claims, with prejudice, for the following reasons: 
Plaintiffs brought six state law causes of action against Utah County Defendants: (1) 
civil conspiracy, (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, (3) intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, (4) defamation, (5) negligent misrepresentation, and (6) intentional 
misrepresentation. However, Plaintiffs failed to strictly comply with the notice requirements of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"), which deprives this Court of subject matter 
jurisdiction to hear the state law claims. 
2 
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A. Claim Against An Employee, 
Plaintiffs conceded during oral argument that Utah County employees Tonya Houck and 
Deputy Morgan were at least acting under color of authority, thus requiring Plaintiffs to file a 
notice of claim under the UGIA prior to bringing this action against them. Utah Code Ann. § 
63G-7-401(2) requires that a person having a claim against a governmental entity or an employee 
of that entity must file a notice of claim prior to maintaining an action against them. After the 
claim is filed, the governmental entity has sixty days to either approve or deny the claim, A 
plaintiff may not bring an action until the claim is denied or the sixty days has expired. 
Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Claim with the Utah County Clerk on October 31, 2007 
and filed their Complaint alleging claims against Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan the 
following day, November 1, 2007, without waiting for Utah County to approve or deny their 
claims against Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck or for the expiration of the sixty days. By 
filing their Complaint prematurely, Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401(2). 
B. Nature of the Claim Asserted. 
Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim failed to meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-
401(3) regarding the nature of the claim asserted. In their Notice of Claim, Plaintiffs recite 
allegations concerning failure to implement and enforce rules, malicious prosecution, and 
conspiracy. However, Plaintiffs never actually stated that they have a claim for malicious 
prosecution nor did they mention anywhere in the facts or the nature of the claims asserted that 
3 
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they had potential claims for defamation, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, or 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as alleged in their Complaint Despite 
Plaintiffs' argument to the contrary, the Notice of Claim, identifying only malicious prosecution 
and conspiracy claims, failed to give enough specificity to Utah County to ascertain its potential 
liability on the claims for defamation, misrepresentation, or infliction of emotional distress. The 
Court concludes that the nature of the claim section in Plaintiffs' Notice of Claim was inadequate 
and therefore, Plaintiffs' claims of defamation, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and 
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are subsequently barred. 
C. Time to Correct or File a New Notice of Claim. 
Plaintiffs' state law claims of negligent and intentional misrepresentation, defamation, 
and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress are tort causes of action. A tort 
cause of action accrues when all its elements come into being and the claim is actionable. 
Retherfordv, AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 975 (Utah 1992). The UGIA requires 
that a notice of claim must be filed within one year after the claim arises. Utah Code Ann. § 
63G~7-401(2). In this instance, the one-year time limit began to run when the elements of civil 
conspiracy, infliction of emotional distress, defamation and misrepresentation accrued.2 These 
alleged torts with regard to Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan took place prior to November 2, 
2006, the day Plaintiff Lewis Pintar was served with the criminal summons. Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs had until November 2, 2007 to file a proper notice of claim with Utah County for their 
state law claims. 
2
 The Utah County Attorneys have already been dismissed from the lawsuit. Therefore, the actions constituting the 
elements of these torts must have been taken by Tonya Houck or Deputy Morgan and not the Utah County attorneys. 
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Plaintiffs argue that the cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until 
the action is terminated in a plaintiffs favor which occurred on August 1, 2007, the day the 
criminal action against Plaintiff Lewis Pintar was dismissed. However, Plaintiffs brought the 
malicious prosecution claim pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Section 1983 claims are not subject 
to the UGIA notice of claim requirements. Even if the Court were to accept Plaintiffs date of 
August 1,2007 as the date the causes of action accrued, Plaintiffs still did not file a proper notice 
of claim on Utah County by August 1, 2008. Therefore, Plaintiffs are barred from correcting or 
filing a proper notice of claim with Utah County. 
To summarize, Plaintiffs' Complaint against Deputy Morgan and Tonya Houck was filed 
prematurely, the notice of claim did not adequately identify the nature of the claims asserted, and 
the time to file a proper notice of claim has expired. Therefore, Plaintiffs' state law claims 
against Utah County Defendants are forever barred, 
III. MOTION TO DISMISS SECTION 1983 CLAIMS. 
The Court GRANTS Utah County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Section 
1983 Claims, with prejudice, for the following reasons: 
A, Utah County, 
Plaintiffs brought claims for malicious prosecution and conspiracy under 42 § U.S.C 
1983 against Utah County Defendants. These claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah RXiv.P. 12(b)(6). A governmental entity may be 
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sued under Section 1983 when an official municipal policy or custom is the "moving force" 
behind the constitutional violation. 
Plaintiffs made no allegations in their Amended Complaint that Utah County policy was 
unconstitutional and instead, argue that Deputy Morgan may be considered a policymaker for the 
State of Utah because she made a unilateral decision within her discretion with regard to the 
arrest and subsequent prosecution of Mr. Pintar. However, Deputy Morgan cannot be considered 
a policymaker for Utah County because her actions, though discretionary, are still constrained by 
other policies and because her decisions are reviewable by others. Additionally, Plaintiffs have 
not alleged that Deputy Morgan's decisions were reviewed and ratified by those having official 
policymaking authority nor can Utah County be held liable for Section 1983 claims under a 
theory of respondeat superior. Therefore, Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims against Utah County 
Defendants fail and must be dismissed. 
B. Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan. 
Tonya Houck and Deputy Morgan are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the 
established qualified immunity framework, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing that Tonya 
Houck and Deputy Morgan violated Mr. Pintar's constitutional rights that were clearly 
established such that a reasonable officer would know that the conduct engaged in by them was 
clearly unlawful. Plaintiffs have alleged that Mr. Pintar has the right under the Fourth 
Amendment to be free from unreasonable seizure and subject to arrest only when there is 
probable cause. The fact that the charges against Mr. Pintar later turned out to be 
3
 Plaintiffs amended their Complaint to include Utah County on February 15,2008. 
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unsubstantiated does not make Tonya Houck's and Deputy Morgan's actions unreasonable in 
light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. 
IV. MOTION TO BIFURCATE. 
Utah County Defendants' Motions to Dismiss have been granted. Therefore the Motion 
to Bifurcate is moot. 
DATED this fd day of JjZfft 2008. 
BY THE COURT: 
Gary D. Stogy \ 
Fourth Judicial District Court Judge 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING 
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Law Offices of Jason L. Pintar 
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Lewis L PINTAR and Afton B. Pintar, Plaintiffs 
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Tonya HOUCK, Susan Morgan, Utah County, Mar-
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Before Judges THORNE, BENCH, and McHUGH. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM: 
*1 Following the dismissal of Defendants Tonya 
Houck, Susan Morgan, and Utah County (the Utah 
County Defendants), Plaintiffs filed a notice of ap-
peal. Plaintiffs concede mat their claims against 
Defendants Martin and Darlene Houck remain 
pending in the trial court. Tins case is before the 
court on the Utah County Defendants' motion for 
summary disposition. 
Under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, "a party may seek certification of finality of an 
order entered in an action involving ... multiple 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No 
Page 1 
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parties if the order adjudicates ... all of the claims 
between two or more but fewer than all of the 
parties, and the trial court finds no just reason for 
the delay." Tyler v. Department of Human Servs., 
874 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1994) (emphasis added). 
Thus, it is well established in Utah case law that the 
process of directing entry of a final judgment under 
rule 54(b) is referred to as certification. See id To 
certify an order as final for purposes of appeal, a 
trial court must "direct the entry of a final judgment 
as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determination ... that 
there is no just reason for delay and upon an ex-
press direction for the entry of judgment." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 54(b). A judgment that does not dispose of 
all parties or claims may be appealed under excep-
tions to the final judgment rule if (1) the judgment 
is certified under rule 54(b), or (2) if the appellate 
court, in its discretion, grants permission to appeal 
by granting a timely petition to appeal under rule 5 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Ken-
necott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 
1099, 1102 (Utah 1991). The partial dismissal that 
Plaintiffs seek to appeal satisfies neither exception 
to the final judgment rule. 
Rule 5(a) contains a savings provision that allows 
an appellate court to consider an appeal from an or-
der that was improperly certified by the trial court 
as final under rule 54(b). Plaintiffs' reliance on that 
savings provision as support for jurisdiction over 
this appeal is misplaced because there was no at-
tempt to obtain certification under rule 54(b). Fur-
thermore, Utah has consistently refused to adopt the 
federal collateral order doctrine as a basis for juris-
diction over an appeal of an interlocutory order. See 
Tyler, 874 P.2d at 119; Merit Elec, v. Department 
of Commerce, 902 P.2d 151, 153 (Utah 
CtApp.1995). 
Plaintiffs concede that the order dismissing the 
Utah County Defendants leaves their remaining 
claims against Defendants Martin and Darlene 
Houck pending in the district court. Plaintiffs' as-
im to Orig. US Gov, Works. 
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Not Reported in P.3d, 2008 WL 5191236 (Utah App.), 2008 UT App 451 
(Cite as: 2008 WL 5191236 (Utah App.)) 
sertion that there is no certification process under 
rule 54(b) is frivolous.1™ In the absence of a 
proper certification under rule 54(b) of a non-final 
judgment, an appellate court must dismiss an ap-
peal of right taken from a judgment that does not 
deteimine all claims as to all parties to the litiga-
tion. See AJ. Mackay Co. v.. OMand Comtr. Co., 
817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991) (concluding that 
where an order is not final and is not certified under 
rule 54(b), the result is 
FN1. We note that nonresident counsel for 
Plaintiffs was admitted pro hac vice by the 
district court pursuant to rule 14-806 of the 
Rules Governing the Utah State Bar. Rule 
14-806 allows the admitting court to con-
sider "whether non resident counsel ... is 
familiar with Utah rules of evidence and 
procedure, including applicable local 
rules'* "in determining whether to enter or 
revoke the order of admission pro hac 
vice." The rule further provides that Utah 
counsel who sponsors an applicant for pro 
hac vice admission shall "continue as one 
of the counsel of record in the case" unless 
substitute counsel appears. See id. dis-
missal). Because Plaintiffs' appeal was 
neither taken from a final, appealable judg-
ment nor from an order properly certified 
as final under rule 54(b), we dismiss the 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction. This dis-
missal is without prejudice to a timely ap-
peal after the entry of a final judgment. 
Utah App.,2008. 
Pintar v. Houck 
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